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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee / Respondent, 
vs. 
CARL McCLELLAN, 
Appellant / Petitioner, 
Case No. 20080350-SC 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO REVERSE 
McCLELLAN'S CONVICTION DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE UTAH 
COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED 
McClellan asserts that in this case the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct were 
violated by Hadfield's abandonment of his responsibilities as trial counsel—without 
making any written or oral withdrawal—to join the Utah County Attorney's Office, the 
agency prosecuting him, while this matter was pending. See Rules 1.3, 1.7, 1.9 and 
1.10(b) (set forth in Petitioner's Brief at 20-21). Hadfield also violated Rule 36(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to seek the approval of the trial court prior to 
any withdrawal as counsel of record for McClellan. Because of Hadfield's conflict of 
interest, the Utah County Attorney's Office also had a conflict of interest that existed at 
the time McClellan was tried. 
1 
In its review of this issue of whether Hadfield'r conflict of interest should have 
disqualified the Utah County Attorney's Office from prosecuting McClellan, the court of 
appeals noted that courts were "split on the proper analysis to be applied with some 
requiring automatic disqualification and others adopting a rebuttable presumption of 
disqualification." State v. McClellan. 2008 UT App 48,1f 16, 179 P-3d 825. McClellan 
asserts that in this specific case it matters not which rule this Court chooses to apply 
because in this case the result should be the same under both a plain error and ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim: McClellan was prejudiced and his conviction should be 
reversed. See State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 85 f 858 (Utah 1992) (cTo ensure faith in the 
impartiality and integrity of the justice system, the appearance of fairness and impartiality 
in the adjudication process must be diligently maintained"). 
The State does not dispute that Hadfield had a conflict of interest because he 
represented McClellan in this very case prior to joining the Utah County Attorney's 
Office while the case was pending. See State's Brief at 29. Moreover, this conflict 
should have been apparent to all counsel and the trial court. Yet, nobody said or did 
anything to protect and preserve McClellan's rights to due process and conflict free 
prosecution and representation, which is necessary to secure the fundamental fairness and 
impartiality of the criminal justice system. 
Judge Harding should have raised the issue, but he remained silent. He presided 
over the case from the beginning and knew that Hadfield had been representing 
McClellan. 
2 
• New counsel for McClellan, Jim Rupei , shouiu =nve raised the issi le but li :" also 
remained silent. Hadfield likewise could have and should have raised the issue in a 
formal motion to withdraw but he, too, said and did nothing. In fact, he never sought to 
withdraw from this matter as counsel for McClellan. 
And Sherry Ragan, who prosecuted this matter for the Utah County Attorney's 
Office, certainly should have raised the conflict. She represented the Utah County 
Attorney's Office in prosecuting this matter fm ..|
 ;- iud as counsel 
for the State in the circuit court at preliminary hearing (R. 2), and at arraignment in the 
district court (R. 24). In both of those pretrial matters. PV1 Hadfield appeared as counsel 
for McClellan (Id.). Yet at a pn axial IK varim i thn M : days before trial-—when Ragan had to 
know that Hadfield was now employed by her office—she said nothing; and likewise on 
the day oi trial, when she announced Hadfield's employment, she said nothing. 
McClellan asserts ii i ^nns for plain error—the 
existence of an **1" i.»us error—a clear conflict of interest—that should have been 
recognized b\ UK trial court, as well as the first prong for ineffective assistance of 
eouiist I thai i nun ,rl , pn h n 111,Mt• i n w \\ In, ii nl 
1 he State asserts that "to prevail on his claim mat Ruptvr was meti'\ • 
defendant must show th:w IT:>jr; AA wn- not screened from this case when he took a 
position witl l ihr i imnh • '• :,, ..n <IK i i u ad suggests that 
Hadfield was screened. / . . J to the extent it does not, record iwy- M • ;• • 1 
Ruppers effectiveness. Defendant thus cannot show that Rupper was ineffective." 
State's Br f a1 - sagrees with these assertions. 
3 
One, the fact that McClellan was offered a continuance of the trial to give new 
counsel more time to prepare cure Hadfield's conflict of interest. Indeed, they are two 
separate issues. A declined offer to continue the trial may moot issues of ineffectiveness 
concerning Rupper's own performance at trial, but it has no impact on Hadfield's conflict 
of interest the prosecution of McClellan. 
Two, McClellan asserts that this Court cannot construe silence by the judge, the 
State and new defense counsel to equate with "satisfaction] that everything was done 
appropriately so as to avoid any due process concern." State's Brief at 31-32. The State 
points to the fact that both defendant and Hadfield testified under oath at a post-trial 
hearing on a motion for new trial, and that the fact the recording of this hearing has been 
destroyed therefore, creates a gap in the record which McClellan failed to cure by not 
including affidavits from Rupper and Hadfield in his 23B motion; and that accordingly, 
any ambiguities should be construed in favor of a finding of effective counsel. State 's 
Brief at 32-33. 
McClellan strongly disagrees that "the record suggests that Hadfield was 
screened." State 's Brief at 34. McClellan's trial counsel did file a motion for new trial in 
which he argued that the taped interview of McClellan should not have been introduced 
into evidence on rebuttal during trial (R. 117-23). In addition, McClellan, pro se, filed a 
hand written request for rehearing, alleging the following errors: That he was prejudiced 
by having women on his jury, and by having a woman prosecutor and probation officer. 
That irrelevant evidence was admitted. And "that [his] attorney didn't represent him to 
4 
his full extent5' (R. 94). No place in these documents is Hadfieta ;. i '• • 
mentioned. 
A hearing on the motions for new trial was held on February 3, 1989 (R. 126). 
However, the recording of that hearing has been destroyed i» i]\ record that exists 
relating to this hearing is the minute entry (R. 126), and the trial court's ruling (R. 127-
28). The iv -hows that McClellan testified as well as Hadfield. The trial 
court's ruling establishes that the issues he considered ; -M • ':on for new trial 
were: the question of the tape recorded interview's admission into evidence, the issue of 
McClellan\s PSl being prepared by a woman, and McClellan's complaint that there were 
no blacks on the jury (R. 127-28). The only other issi 1 court in its 
ruling is "that defendant's original counsel left the case and [McClellan"s| original 
counsel le case and lie was assigned new counsel and that the new counsel was 
unable to prepare adequately. The defei I was retailvely new to 
the case, and was offered the opportunity to get a continuance. Instead he opted to go 
forwni'i i hi iii.tl ' I I i. Again, there is nothing in lids K-eord that remotely 
suggests that Hadfield was scree?- ! i. ,:M isn't even mentioned 
any where in the record. 
McClellan asserts that tlic court of appeals erred in concluding that there are gaps 
,., ihc record oi tl rat the i a : M M a record simply does 
not exist because nobody raised the issue—not new defense counsel, 
'a* M«U, t simply, there was no attempt made by new counsel, who appeared 
ioi thi- in • • . judge, or . . \\u State, to address the issue 
5 
of Hadfield's conflict of interest and/or to establish adequate screening by the Utah 
County Attorney's Office prior to trial. 
McClellan asserts that this Court should adopt the same per se rale of 
disqualification, which was established in State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992), for 
cases of dual prosecution and defense representation by lawyers. The court of appeals 
concluded that while this case raises similar concerns as Brown, "we believe that those 
concerns can be alleviated, short of disqualification of the entire office...." McClellan, 
2008 UT App 48, If 18, 179 P.3d 825. However, McClellan asserts that the same 
concerns expressed by this Court in Brown are such that a similar ruling is necessary 
here. 
In Brown, this Court reversed a conviction where defendant was tried in district 
court in Brigham City and his defense counsel also worked as a part-time prosecutor for 
the city of Tremonton. In reaching the decision to reverse, this Court stated, cTo ensure 
faith in the impartiality and integrity of the justice system, the appearance of fairness and 
impartiality in the adjudication process must be diligently maintained." Brown, 853 P.2d 
at 858. Accordingly, this Court found that conflicts of interest exist whenever a city 
prosecutor is appointed to represent an indigant defendant, and that such a conflict creates 
an "unavoidable appearance of impropriety." Id. Furthermore, this Court concluded that, 
"Because a concrete showing of prejudice would be very difficult to make when a 
prosecutor if appointed to assist in the defense of an accused, we conclude that it is 
unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual prejudice. 
6 
Instead, we announce a per se rule of reversal whenever such dual representation is 
undertaken so as to prevent its recurrence." Brown, 853 P.2d at 859. 
In this case it is undisputable that cca substantial factual relationship is shown 
between matters." Indeed the matter is the same. Hadfield's representation of McClellan 
was in regards to this prosecution, and during his representation of McClellan he was 
apparently in the process of obtaining employment by the veiy agency that was 
prosecuting his client. Moreover, the appearance of impropriety in this situation—like 
that in Brown—is unavoidable. Except for disqualification of the Utah County 
Attorney's Office under these facts, there is no other way in which "the appearance of 
fairness and impartiality in the adjudication process" can be diligently maintained. 
In addition, even if the Court of Appeals was correct in not adopting a rule of per 
se disqualification, under these facts, McClellan's conviction must still be reversed. 
Under the rule articulated by the court of appeals in tins case, a showing by the 
prosecution that effective screening procedures have been used to isolate former defense 
counsel is essential. McClellan asserts that such a showing by the prosecution at the time 
of trial was not made. In fact, no showing of any screening whatsoever by the Utah 
County Attorney's Office was demonstrated. 
One, because new defense counsel did not request disqualification or otherwise 
raise the issue. 
Two, because the trial court—whose responsibility it is to control and manage the 
trial process in such a way that integrity, fairness and thoroughness are preserved—did 
7 
not demand assurances from the prosecution that Hadfield had been completely screened 
from the matter. 
And three, because the Utah County Attorney's Office also said and did nothing to 
establish that they had taken the necessary steps to appropriately screen Hadfield from 
the prosecution. Even under the rule adopted by the court of appeals, it was the duty of 
the Utah County Attorney's Office to rebut the presumption that they should be 
disqualified. 
At the time of trial, there was no showing by the Utah County's Attorney's Office 
of effective screening procedures which would be the only way to rebut the presumption 
of disqualification. Because that presumption was not rebutted at trial by the Utah 
County Attorney's Office, they should have been disqualified. See Lux v. 
Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 145, 152 (Va. App. 1997) ("Because the Commonwealth did 
not meet its burden of proving that it had implemented effective screening procedures to 
prevent the disclosure of appellant's confidences, we hold that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it denied appellant's motion to disqualify the Commonwealth's 
attorney"). 
The trial court therefore committed plain error in not disqualifying that office, and 
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request such a disqualification. Nobody 
was looking out for McClellan's right to due process and conflict free prosecution, and 
none of the officers of the court were committed to impartial and fair proceedings. As a 
result, there was no showing by the prosecution of screening and even under the 
"majority rule," McClellan's conviction must be reversed. 
8 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF RULE 
16(g), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND IN FAILING TO FIND 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO 
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE MADE KNOWN TO DEFENDANT IN THE MIDDLE OF 
THE TRIAL BECAUSE OF BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE STATE 
The State argues that the discoveiy violation here was not a due process violation, 
essentially because the evidence on the tape was not exculpatory nor did it introduce any 
new substantive evidence. State '& Brief at 39, 40. The State further asserts that there was 
no bad faith involved in the lack of disclosure of the tape's existence until the rebuttal 
portion of the jury trial. State 's Brief at 44-45. 
At trial, McClellan twice sought to have the State precluded from playing a 
portion of this taped interview to the jury on grounds of surprise. The second time he 
argued: "We were unaware of the tape recording. And we were also unaware, Your 
Honor, that tape recording existed. Even Sherry Ragan (the prosecutor) was unaware of 
the tape existing until after the defendant's testimony. The officers clearly had withheld 
that evidence from both the prosecutor and myself as a clear surprise, and therefore it 
ought to be suppressed" (R. 388: 8). 
The trial court allowed the admission of the tape as "a proper introduction of 
evidence for rebuttal purposes" based upon McClellan's testimony (R. 388: 8). After 
sentencing, McClellan filed a motion for new trial. In denymg the motion, Judge 
Harding held that admission of the tape was proper because "the defense had essentially 
the same notice of the existence of the [audiotape] recording as the prosecution, it's 
introduction was not prejudicial" (R. 127). 
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Portions of the taped interview weie placed ftv thejuiy (P °88 20-22) 
However the audiotape was not transcribed as part of the tiial tianscupt although it was 
requested Duimg its delibeiations, the jury lequested to heai the entne interview The 
trial court denied the lequest (R 66A) The tape has since disappeaied 
While McClellan concedes that the tape lecoiding was a surpuse to him and to the 
prosecutoi Sherry Ragan he does not concede that theie was no bad faith m\ olved The 
very basis of his aiguments m legards to the tape befoie the trial court weie surpnse and 
that the police had withheld the existence of the lecoided mteiview (P. 388 8) 
Undei oui laws and constitutions a piosecutoi has a duty to disclose Suppiession 
by the State of eudence favoiable to the accused \iolates due piocess if the evidence is 
material to the guilt oi to the punishment Good faith of the prosecution m such an 
mst iceisinelevant State v Jarrell 608 P 2d 218 224 (Utah 1980) Obviously the 
tape was relevant to the guilt of innocence of McClellan Morevoer, Ihe fact that the 
prosecutor apparently had little or no advance notice of the existence of the recorded 
interview is irrelevant "Information known to police officers working on a case is 
charged to the prosecution since the officers aie part of the piosecution team " State v 
Shabata, 678 P 2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984) (citing Barbee v Warden, 331 F 2d 842, 846 (4* 
Cir 1964) "Neither the prosecutor noi officers working on a case may withhold 
exculpatory evidence oi evidence valuable to a defendant " Id (citmg State v Johnson, 
223 Kan 119, 124, 573 P 2d 976, 980 (1977) Certainly, at the very least, this recorded 
interview was evidence valuable to McClellan There is no argument that the existence 
of this recordmg was withheld by the officers m this case They supplied the police 
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reports but they withheld the existence of tape until rebuttal in order to destroy 
McClellan's credibility and portray him as a liar. McClellan asserts that this does indeed 
constitute bad faith in the withholding of potentially exculpatory, but certainly valuable, 
evidence from the defense; and that as such, notions of due process and fundamental 
fairness are certainly implicated. 
A portion of the tape was played to the jury to impeach McClellan's trial 
testimony. The interview was also of sufficient importance to the jury that they requested 
to hear the entire interview, a request that was denied by the trial court with no record of 
consultation with the parties (R. 66A). However, beyond that neither counsel for 
McClellan nor this Court can be certain as to the contents and or importance of the 
interview. This case was entirely about credibility: the credibility of Judy Tidwell versus 
the credibility of Carl McClellan. There was no physical evidence of rape. In fact, 
Tidwell's hymen was intact, there was only minor redness in the vaginal area, and there 
was no sperm present despite Tidwell's trial testimony concerning ejaculation. 
Because of the bad faith involved in the police's withholding of the evidence from 
the defense, McClellan asserts that exclusion of the evidence is the only appropriate 
remedy and the trial court abused its discretion in admitting it into evidence. "Due 
process requires that material evidence be disclosed in a timely manner." State v. 
Gulbrandson, 906 P.2d 579, 596 (Ariz. 1995). In addition, "The philosophy of the 
Criminal Rules is to remove the element of gamesmanship from a trial," State v. 
Howard, 383 N.E.2d 912, 915 (Ohio 1978). In this case, that philosophy and purpose 
behind the rules was blatantly violated by the bad faith conduct of the police, and 
11 
McClellan's rights to duo prccess were violated. Furthermore, because the audiotape was 
not transcribed and apparently no longer exists (R. 395: 5), McClellan asserts that 
prejudice must be presumed because the record is inadequate for this court to properly 
consider its impact upon the jury and its impact upon McClellan's defense. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, McClellan asks that this Court reverse the decision of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, and reverse his conviction for rape, a first degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of February, 2009. 
^ 
Margaret**. Lindsay^ 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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